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Billboard Regulations, and Aesthetics
Richard Sutton*
T HE REGULATION OF OUTDOOR ADVERTISING has prompted a surprisingly
prodigious amount of controversy and litigation. It has been
challenged as a denial of free speech,1 due process, 2 and equal pro-
tection; 3 it has been upheld on nuisance 4 and real property 5 grounds,
and sustained on the basis of public health,6 safety,7 morality, 8 com-
fort and convenience,9 aesthetics, 10 and the right to be let alone."
*B.A., Ohio Wesleyan University; fourth-year student, Cleveland State University
College of Law.
1 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), which held that guarantees of free
speech and press impose no restraint upon governmental regulation of purely
commercial advertising. See also Comment, Zoning, Aesthetics, and the First Amend-
ment, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 81 (1964).
2 Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); O'Mealia Outdoor Advertising
Co. v. Borough of Rutherford, 128 N.J.L. 587, 27 A.2d 863 (Sup. Ct. 1942); Mid-
State Advertising Corp. v. Bond, 274 N.Y. 82, 8 N.E.2d 286 (1937) ; Ohio Valley
Advertising Corp. v. Linzell, 107 Ohio App. 351, 152 N.E.2d 380 (Ct. App. 1957),
aff'd, 168 Ohio St. 259 (1958) ; Ellis v. Ohio Turnpike Comm., 162 Ohio St. 86, 120
N.E.2d 719 (1954); State ex rel. Central Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Leonhard, 50
Ohio Op. 162, 124 N.E.2d 187 (C.P. 1952). For a discussion of fifth amendment
compensation clause, see Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L. J. 36 (1965).
3 Chicago v. Pennsylvania R.R., 41 I1. 2d 245, 242 N.E.2d 152 (1968) ; Ghaster Prop-
erties Inc. v. Preston, 20 Ohio Op.2d 51, 184 N.E.2d 552 (C.P. 1962); Central Out-
door Advertising Co. v. Village of Evendale, 54 Ohio Op. 354, 124 N.E.2d 189
(C.P. 1954) ; Comment, Outdoor Advertising Control Along the Interstate Highwvay
System, 46 CAL. L. REV. 796 (1958).
4 New York State Thruway Authority v. Ashley Motor Court, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 151,
176 N.E.2d 566 (1961); Martin v. Williams, 141 W.Va. 595, 93 S.E.2d 835 (1956);
People v. Rubenfeld, 254 N.Y. 245, 172 N.E. 485 (1930), where it was said that
one of the unsettled legal questions is the extent to which the concept of nuisance
may be enlarged by the legislature to give protection to sensibilities that are merely
cultural or aesthetic. To the effect that billboard advertising is not inherently a
nuisance, see Central Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Village of Evendale, 54 Ohio Op.
354, 124 N.E.2d 189 (C.P. 1954) ; Loth v. Columbia Theater, 197 Mo. 328, 94 S.W.
847 (1906) ; Comment, Zoning and the Law of Nuisance, 29 FOD-AM L. REv. 749
(1961).
5 People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal.2d 390, 144 P.2d 799 (1943) ; Kelbro Inc. v. Myrick, 113
Vt. 64, 30 A.2d 257 (1943). An interesting theory that outdoor advertising is an
excess use of an appurtenant easement of visibility vested in the highway authority
is proposed in Wilson, Billboards and the Right to be Seen from the Highway,
30 GEO. L. J. 723 (1942).
Thomas Cusack Co. v. Chicago, 267 I1. 344, 108 N.E. 340 (1915), aff'd, 242 U.S.
526 (1917).
Paulus v. Smith, 70 III. App.2d 97, 217 N.E.2d 527 (1966) ; Wolverine Sign Works
v. City of Bloomfield Hills, 279 Mich. 205, 271 N.W. 823 (1937) ; Perlmutter v.
Greene, 259 N.Y. 327, 182 N.E. 5 (1932).
8 St. Louis Gunning Advertisement Co. v. St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99, 137 S.W. 929 (1911).
9 Ghaster Properties Inc. v. Preston, 176 Ohio St. 425, 200 N.E.2d 328 (1964).
10 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) ; State ex rel. Boozer v. Miami, 193 So.2d 449
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Ware v. Wichita, 113 Kan. 153, 214 P.99 (1923) ; Moore
v. Ward, 377 S.W.2d 881 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964); New Orleans v. Pergament, 198
La. 851, 5 So.2d 129 (1941) ; General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Dept. of Public
Works, 289 Mass. 149, 193 N.E. 799 (1935); State v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 13, 174
N.W. 885 (1920) ; People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272 (1963) ; Oregon
City v. Hartke, 240 Ore. 35, 400 P.2d 255 (1965).
11 General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Dept. of Public Works, 289 Mass. 149, 193
N.E. 799 (1935). See also Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 110 (1932), where
the court said that ". . . the radio can be turned off, but not so the billboard . . ."
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Enough legal theories have been propounded to sufficiently obscure
the real issues and to provide the courts with ample authority to
support any decision deemed, at the time, expedient. Controls im-
posed through ordinances and statutes upon the location of outdoor
advertising devices have undergone a curiously awkward evolution,
and though the trend toward upholding most types of billboard reg-
ulations is now clear, the reasoning often is not.
In view of the perplexing array of case precedents, inevitably
resulting in a lack of adequate statutory guidelines, a need for clar-
ification in this clouded area of the law becomes apparent. Much of
the ambiguity stems from a prevalent judicial tendency to permit
changes in the substance, yet to retain the traditional form of the
law. Unlikely efforts to squeeze regulations neatly within well-rec-
ognized legal niches have proved successful, as most courts jealously
guard against any perceptible extension of the police power.12
Even though the only true rationale behind the regulation of
signs along public highways is to preserve and enhance the beauty
of the environment, most jurisdictions have refused to recognize
this purpose alone to be constitutionally legitimate and have relied
instead upon circuitous grounds of questionable legal validity. It is
no wonder that state legislatures have experienced difficulty in
drafting regulations having a substantial connection with a consti-
tutionally recognized pursuit, when the real purpose has not yet
been legitimated.
Under the assumption that billboard regulations are socially de-
sirable, an honest effort should be made to select and define proper
ends, and to relate such ends with appropriate means. It is the con-
tention of this paper that:
(1) courts must unequivocably recognize society's interest in
preserving the natural beauty of the environment along transporta-
tion corridors as falling within the scope of state police power;
(2) state legislatures must control outdoor advertising devices
through means reasonably adapted to accomplish well-defined and
permissible purposes. Such regulation is best achieved through state
and local zoning authorities.
A brief case history to illustrate the nature of the problem is
next appropriate, followed by a suggested basis for upholding bill-
board legislation and a proposed approach for drafting future legis-
lation.
History
One of the earliest treatments of the subject promulgated the
notion that all statutory restrictions on the use of property are im-
12 An analysis of the changing substance of billboard law within a static form is con-
tained in Comment, Regulations of Outdoor Advertising for Aesthetic Reasons: A Jur-
isprudential Viec, 6 ST. Louis U.L.J. 534 (1961).
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posed when necessary for the safety, health, or comfort of the public;
but a limitation without reason or necessity cannot be enforced.' 3
Following this traditionally narrow interpretation of police power,
sign regulations were consistently struck down 14 for nearly two
decades.
Interestingly, the courts at this early stage were concerned with
aesthetics, not as a serious basis for supporting billboard controls,
but rather as a convenient way of disallowing them. Two Massa-
chusetts cases15 voiced opposition to the surrender of property rights
for purely aesthetic reasons. An early Illinois case' 6 pronounced a
residential ordinance invalid because it prevented sights considered
offensive merely to the aesthetic sensibilities of certain individuals:
California 17 likewise stated that a man may not be deprived of -his
property because his tastes are not like those of his neighbors; al-
though in the same year the U.S. Supreme Court did recognize that
considerations of taste and beauty may enter in as auxiliary claims.' t
In 1910 it was stated that the promotion of aesthetics or artistic con-
siderations could be a proper object of governmental care, although
it was not held that such considerations alone would justify restric-
tions on the rights of private property owners.19 The recognition of
aesthetics, at least as a supporting reason for billboard regulation,
had thus materialized. 20
A year later, the tide in rejecting billboard ordinances on aes-
thetic grounds was reversed with the discovery of a comparatively
painless method of bringing such controls under traditional police
power requisities. A Missouri court had little hesitation in finding
a valid exercise of the police power where billboards were liable to .be
blown down and injure pedestrians, gather refuse and paper, and
were used as dumping places, as public privies, and as hiding places
for criminals.21 Through similarly remarkable ingenuity, an Illinois
court recognized regulations as falling well within public health,
Is Crawford v. City of Topeka, 51 Kan. 756, 33 P. 476 (1893).
14 City of Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting, Advertising & Sign Painting Co., 70 N.J.L.
285, 62 A. 627 (Ct. Err. & App. 1905) ; State v. Whitlock, 149 N.C. 543, 63 S.E. 123
(1908); Bryan v. City of Chester, 212 Pa. 259, 61 A. 894 (1905).
15 Welch v. Swasey, 193 Mass. 364, 79 N.E. 745 (1907), aftd, 214 U.S. 91 (1909)
Commonwealth v. Boston Advertising Co., 188 Mass. 348, 74 N.E. 601 (1905),
16 Chicago v. Gunning System, 214 111. 628, 73 N.E. 1035 (1905). The Illinois Supreme
Court later stated the prevalent view as, ". . . courts of this country have with
great unanimity held that the police power cannot interfere with private property
rights for purely aesthetic purposes." Heller Sign Works v. Physical Culture Training
School, 249 I1. 436, 443, 94 N.E. 920, 923 (1911).
17 Varney & Green v. Williams, 155 Cal. 318, 100 P. 867 (1909).
18 Welch v. Swasey, 193 Mass. 364, 79 N.E. 745 (1907), affd, 214 U.S. 91 (1909).
10 Curran Bill Posting and Distributing Co. v. Denver, 47 Colo. 221, 107, P. 261 (1910).
20 R. ANDEooN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZoNIG 441 (1968), suggests that aesthetic objectives
are secondary or cumulative. Judge Pound stated in Perlmutter v. Greene, 259 N.Y.
327, 332, 182 N.E. 5, 6 (1932), "[b]eauty may not be queen, but she is not an out-
cast beyond the pale protection or respect. She may at least shelter herself under
the wing of safety, morality, or decency."
21 St. Louis Gunning Advertisement Co. v. St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99, 137 S.W. 929 (19.11).
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safety, morals, and welfare requirements in view of the liability of
fire, dangerous construction techniques, probable display of ob-
scene printing tending to demoralize and injure public morals, pro-
tection offered to disorderly and lawbreaking persons, incidents of
crimes against women and children such as indecent exposure, de-
posits of breeding disease germs commonly found behind billboards,
and the likelihood of dissolute and immoral practices carried on
under the cover and shield furnished by billboards.22
In 1915 a better-reasoned opinion stated that the real and sole
value of the billboard lay in its proximity to public thoroughfares;
hence, the regulation of billboards is not so much a regulation of
private property as a control over the use of the streets.23 This more
enlightened approach did not, however, gain immediate acceptance;
and concern for private property rights continued to pose a consider-
able obstacle to the attempted control of outdoor advertising devices.
The aesthetics debate meanwhile, had become increasingly
prominent and set the stage for most subsequent litigation. By 1927
a New York court admitted that the point had been reached in the
development of the police power where an aesthetic purpose needed
but little assistance from a practical one in order to withstand attack
on constitutional grounds. 24 Aesthetic motives were often held to be
incident, but not the moving factor, behind regulations. 25 In 1935,
however, a Massachusetts court, in completely reversing its previous
stance,2 6 held that considerations of taste and fitness may be a proper
basis for action in granting or denying permits for the location of
advertising devices. 27 This was perhaps the first unquestionable
acknowledgment of aesthetics as a sole basis for sign regulations.
The majority of decisions in the past twenty-five years, while
approving of aestheticism, have strained to find justification, for a
particular ordinance or statute elsewhere in the concept of public
health, safety, or welfare.28 The cases have by no means been in
accord; a 1942 opinion echoed the earlier cry that aesthetic considera-
tions are a matter of luxury and indulgence rather than of public
22 Thomas Cusack Co. v. Chicago, 267 I1. 34-4, 108 N.E. 340 (1915), citing Chicago
v. Gunning System, 214 Ill. 628, 73 N.E. 1035 (1905).
23 Mercantile Advertising Agency, 32 Philippine R. 580 (1915), appeal dismissed, 248
U.S. 591 (1915).
24 People v. Sterling, 128 Misc. 650, 220 N.Y. Supp. 315 (Sup. Ct. 1927).
25 Wolverine Sign Works v. City of Bloomfield Hills, 279 Mich. 205, 271 N.W. 823
(1937) ; Perlmutter v. Greene, 259 N.Y. 327, 182 N.E. 5 (1932).
20 Welch v. Swasey, 193 Mass. 304, 79 N.E. 745 (1907), affd, 214 U.S. 91 (1909);
Commonwealth v. Boston Advertising Co., 188 Mass. 348, 74 N.E. 601 (1905).
27 General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Dept. of Public Works, 289 Mass 149, 193 N.E.
799 (1935). 1
28 Chandler, The Attitude of the Law Toward Beauty, 8 A.B.A.J. 470, 472 (1922).
"Has the time not come when the courts will drop the mask of an exclusive concern
for safety and health that in the case of billboards is not real, and frankly approve
reasonable regulations of the use of property in the interest of beauty".
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol21/iss2/19
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necessity.2 9 In Wolverine Sign Works v. City of Bloom field Heights,"°
the dissenting opinion strayed dangerously close to the truth in
stating that:
[M]ost courts will not uphold such ordinances on aes-
thetic reasons alone, but many of the decisions, in order to
uphold such ordinances, have supplemented these reasons
with fantastic arguments that billboards are a menace to
public safety, provide convenient places to harbor criminals,
and furnish a rendezvous for immorality.
This analysis of the situation appears, in historical perspective,
to be a correct one.
In the face of such uncertainty in the constitutional status of
billboard regulations, Congress, in 1958, included in the Federal Aid
Highway Act provisions designed to encourage and assist states in
the control of outdoor advertising on the national system of inter-
state highways.3' Each state, although legally obligated to do nothing,
could receive a bonus of one-half of one per cent in their applicable
federal aid allotment on projects where outdoor advertising was
controlled in accordance with the enunciated national policy.32
Through this process of mild persuasion, several states,33 including
Ohio, enacted regulations patterned after the national standards.
Approval of this legislation, however, by the state courts was not
automatic. The Ohio statute 4 in Ghaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston5
was held unconstitutional as a taking without compensation of valu-
able property rights, a denial of equal protection, and as lacking a
reasonable relationship to a purpose within the scope of the police
power. Two years later, upon appeal of the same case,36 The Ohio
Supreme Court succinctly overcame these objections, adding that
although the federal subsidy may have been one of the incentives
behind the act, that fact should not affect its validity. The Ohio high
court upheld the statute on the basis of public safety, comfort, con-
venience, and peace of mind. It expressly avoided the question of
whether the preservation of natural scenic beauty would in and of
29 O'Mealia Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Borough of Rutherford, 128 N.J.L. 587, 27
A.2d 863 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
30 279 Mich. 205, 209, 271 N.W. 823, 825 (1937) (dissenting opinion).
31 23 U.S.C. § 131 (a) (1966) states that it is in the public interest to encourage and
assist the states to control the use of and to improve areas adjacent to the Interstate
System by controlling the erection and maintenance of outdoor advertising signs,
displays, and devices adjacent to that System.
32 23 U.S.C. § 131 (c) (1965).
33 As of 1969, however, only ten states had passed laws in compliance with the 1965
Beautification Act deemed satisfactory to the Federal Highway Administration.
Hearings on High.ay Beautification Aet of 1965 Before the Subcommittee on Roads
of the House Committee on Public lVorks, 91st Cong., lst Sess., at 152 (1969).
34 Omo REv. CoDE ANN. §§ 5516.01-.05, 5516.99 (Page 1958).
35 20 Ohio Op.2d 51, 184 N.E.2d 552 (C.P. 1962).
36 Ghaster Properties Inc- v. Preston, 176 Ohio St. 425, 200 N.E.2d 328 (1964). This
case suggests that in drafting a statute, the legislature could give proper weight to its
effect in promoting the comfort, convenience and peace of mind of those who use
the highways by removing annoying intrusions upon that use.
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itself be a sufficient basis for the legislation, indicating that there
are other factors which weigh heavily in the balance of legislative
decisions.
Although aesthetics was not directly considered in Ghaster, a
later Ohio case, 7 dealing with a statute regulating junkyards out-
side municipalities, held that:
. . . aesthetic considerations can support these statutes be-
cause interference with the natural aesthetics of the sur-
rounding countryside caused by an unfenced or inadequately
fenced junkyard is generally patent and gross, and not merely
a matter of bad taste . . . The connection between general
welfare and the need for regulation of the use of private
property must be subject to continuous review by the courts
... to determine whether the need for regulation in light of
the general welfare has not yet ripened or has waned.
This court, however, was reluctant to provide an unlimited en-
dorsement of aesthetics:
[t]his holding is not to be construed as a blanket ap-
proval of all regulation based upon aesthetics . . . . Other
jurisdictions have held that the legislatures may determine
that a community should be beautiful . . . so large a step
presupposes an exact definition of beauty which is acceptable
to all tastes.37a
Illuminated only by the foregoing standards of comfort, conven-
ience, peace of mind, and patent and gross interference with natural
beauty, the true basis for sustaining billboard legislation in Ohio,
as in other states, remains nebulous. It therefore becomes necessary
to more carefully define an objective and judicially determine the
appropriateness of that objective.
A Basis for Legislation
Probably the most common ground for sustaining billboard reg-
ulations lies within the concept of the police power (an occasional
supporting argument has been raised on real property principles,18
but this view has not been widely accepted). A state's police power
is broad,39 and has no exact definition, 40 but its exercise is subject
to a test of reasonableness. 41 Courts have predictably differed on the
question whether a given law does or does not come within the
police power,42 but there is a strong presumption in favor of the
validity of a law enacted under this comprehensive doctrine. 43 It
37 State v. Buckley, 16 Ohio St.2d 128, 132, 243 N.E.2d 66, 70 (1968).
37a Id.
28 People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal.2d 390, 144 P.2d 799 (1943); Kelbro Inc. v. Myrick, 113
Vt. 64, 30 A.2d 527 (1943) ; Wilson, Billboards and the Right to be Seen from the
Highway, 30 GEO. L. J. 723( 1942).
89 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
40 Sax, Taking and the Police Power, 74 YALE L. J. 36, 38 (1965).
41 Moore, Regulation of Outdoor Advertising for Aesthetic Purposes, 8 ST. Louis U.LJ.
191, 202 (1963).
42 H. DAVIS, THE JUDICIAL VETO 10 (1971).
43 Central Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Village of Evandale, 54 Ohio Op. 354, 124 N.E.2d
189 (C.P. 1954).
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is easily the least limitable of the powers of government and extends
to all'the great public needs. 4 4 The better reasoned cases have recog-
nized billboard controls as falling within one of two specific elements
of the police power: public safety and/or general welfare (viz. aes-
thetics).
Public safety is a somewhat tenuous ground for upholding legis-
lation. in that most studies show no conclusive relationship between
regulation and the prevention of accidents. 45 Billboards, nevertheless,
have been decried as a menace to safety by distracting the motorist,
impairing his field of vision, and creating confusion with official
signs." The American Automobile Association has stated:
Traffic flow and safety is jeopardized when motorists
must cope with uncontrolled competition of commercial ad-
vertising and official signs near interchanges on high speed
expressways. 47
Regardless of the validity, as yet unproved, of this opinion, bill-
board control along highways in non-urban areas would seem to have
an even less direct connection with public safety. Furthermore, there
may be some merit in the claim that billboards help prevent "high-
way hypnosis",48 a condition attributed to motorists travelling at a
constant speed along vast stretches of monotonous roadway. Safety,
as a legitimate public concern, may be sufficient to justify control of
advertising devices under specific circumstances (e.g., near inter-
changes) ;49 but the difficulty in relating most controls to a safety
objective would diminish the efficacy of using public safety as a
statutory guideline.
As suggested earlier, the only true purpose behind billboard
legislation was to preserve the natural beauty of the environment.
While most legal scholars agree that aesthetics alone should be a
constitutionally permissible end,50 they are generally apprehensive
44 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1933).
45 Federal Advertising Corp. v. Hardin, 137 N.J.L. 468, 60 A.2d 615 (Sup. Ct. 1948);
O'Mealia Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Borough of Rutherford, 128 N.J.L. 587, 27 A.2d
863 (Sup. Ct. 1942). See also Cunningham, Constitutional Law-- The Police Power:
Billboard Regulation Along the New York State Thruway: New York Public Author-
ities Law 361a, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 647 (1962); Price, Billboard Regulations Along
Interstate Highway System, 8 KAN. L. R. 81 (1959).
4e Laggis, The Role of Aesthetics in the Exercise of Police Power and its Application
to South Dakota's Highway Beautification Statute, 11 S. DAK. L. R. 157 (1966).
47 Hearings on H. R. 8678 Before the Senate Committee on Public Works, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess., at 2743 (1959).
48 Comment, Ohio Interstate Highway Adv.ertising Prohibition Held Unconstitutional,
25 OHio ST. L. J. 99 (1964).
49 E.g., North Dakota permits no advertising signs within one thousand feet of a grade
crossing, and any sign deemed to be a traffic hazard, in the judgment of the Com-
mission, shall be removed. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 24-01-12 (1970).
50 Norton, Police Power, Planning, and Aesthetics. 7 SANTA CLARA LAW 171 (1967);
Simiele, Constitutional Law-Ohio Billboard Statute-Unconstitutional, 14 W. R.s.
L. REv. 819 (1962); Wilcox, Aesthetic Considerations in Land Use Planning, 35
ALBANY L. RV. 126 (1971) ; Williams, Legal Techniques to Protect and to Promote
-Aesthetics Along Transportation Corridors, 17 BUFFALO L. ReV. 701 (1968). See also
Laggis, supra note 46; Comment, sutra note 3; Comment, supra note 48.
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of the inherently subjective nature of the concept. 51 Subjective stand-
ards,. it is argued,52 should not be placed on an equal standing with
general welfare of the people. Query: is "general welfare" an alto-
gether, objective standard?5 3
The point has been tirelessly reiterated that the police power
cannot be exercised for the exclusive purpose of gratifying and cul-
tivating aesthetic tastes. 54 Even graver apprehension is manifested
in the idea that personal freedom would be lost in the despotic will
of the government.55 Such objections appear far more subjective
than the proposition they were designed to meet. It might be noted
that the word "aesthetics" was first used to designate the science
of sensuous knowledge, the goal of which is beauty, in contrast with
logic, whose goal is truth.5 6 Avoiding any laborious philosophical
discussion, suffice it to say that aesthetic considerations can and have
afforded practical standards for equitably determining the placement
of .outdoor advertising devices.
Florida has recognized the role of aesthetics in relation to tourism
and has developed a commercial acceptance of aesthetics. In Sunad,
Inc. v. City of Sarasota,57 the court said that aesthetic considerations
could be a just cause for regulating advertising signs in the city of
Sarasota because it is a center of culture and beauty. New York
has taken a similar approach in Cromwell v. Ferriers58
The exercise of the police power should not extend to
every artistic conformity or nonconformity. Rather, what is
involved are those aesthetic considerations which bear sub-
stantially on the economic, social, and cultural patterns of
a community. Advertising signs and billboards, if misplaced,
often are egregious examples of ugliness, distraction, and
deterioration.
Fears of a platonic imposition of the artistic and cultural sensi-
bilities of a few could be substantially allayed by adopting a narrower
51 Basinski, Constitutional Laq---Ohio Billboard Statute-Valid Exercise of State Police
Power, 16 W. Ras. L. Ray. 431 (1965). The author is concerned about courts being
the sole determiner of beauty, and about extensions of aesthetics into other fields.
,For the view that the majority of courts are cautious in expanding the concept of
.general welfare, see Cunningham, supra note 45 at 654.
52 DiCello, Aesthetics and the Police Power, 18 CLEVE.-MAL L. REV. 384 (1969).
53 H; DAvs, supra note 43 at 13, states, ". . . we have welcomed the construction of the
of the doubtful general welfare clause as authorizing a practically unlimited function
of centralized government."
54 Federal Electric Co. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 398 Ill. 142, 75 N.E.2d 359 (1947);
See also Ghaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston, 20 Ohio Op.2d 51,55, 184 N.E.2d 552,
557 (C.P. 1962), where the court said, "[c]ertain Legislatures might consider that
it was more important to cultivate a taste for jazz than for Beethoven, for posters
than for Rembrandt, and for limericks than for Keats".
5 Curran Bill Posting and Distributing Co. v. Denver, 47 Colo. 221, 107 P.261 (1910).
56 Merrit v. Peters, 65 So.2d 861, 863-4 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1953).
57 122 So.2d 611 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1960). Two years later, a lower Florida court said,
[i]f motel price signs create a honky-tonk atmosphere that operates to drive tourists
from Vero Beach motels, then the adverse effect on the city is economic." Eskind v.
City of Vero Beach, 150 So.2d 254, 257 (Fla. Ct. App. 1962).
58 19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749 (1963).
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concept of aesthetic Society has a legitimate interest in protecting
the natural beauty of its environment, not in dictating standards
of culture and taste. The key to an acceptable standard may be natural
beauty. In some areas of the countryside, no structure would be ap-
propriate; in other areas, attractive signs may not deter from the
surroundings.59 Certainly a landscape pock-marked by strip mining
could not be aesthetically damaged by the presence of certain signs.
The specific restriction of aesthetic considerations exclusively to
commercial advertising along public highways would not have to
open a "Pandora's box" resulting in further proliferation of the con-
cept into other fields. To the contrary, aesthetics has already been
recognized in junkyard cases,60 and the ramifications of extending
this concept to advertising signs and billboards are relatively insig-
nificant.
Courts need not be so saddled wth ancient precedent that they
close their eyes to change.6' In Mid-State Advertising Corp. v. Bond,
62
it was expressed that:
[c]ircumstances, surrounding conditions, changed social
attitudes, newly-acquired knowledge, do not alter the Con-
stitution, but they do alter our view of what is reasonable.
Restrictions upon the use of property which were deemed
unreasonable in 1909, are regarded today as entirely reason-
able and natural.
A major change is not even necessary to overrule former hold-
ings since any such change in position may be attributed to the
broadened scope of the police power resulting from alterations in
public demands and attitudes.63
A number of jurisdictions have already sanctioned aesthetics
as a constitutionally permissible purpose. 64 The significance of pre-
serving environmental beauty has been expressed by Lyndon John-
son,65 and has apparently been realized by the Supreme Court, which
said in Berman v. Parker :66
59 Florida Congressman Cramer stated that there are many areas of America which
are industrial and nonbeautiful from a scenic standpoint, or which are obviously
going to develop in the future from an industrial business standpoint that can pro-
vide needed information to the motorist. It was also argued in these hearings that
much of rural land is not beautiful, is appropriate for signs, and is desperately
needed for signs. Hearings on Highway Beautification Act, supra note 33 at 158.
60 State v. Buckley, 16 Ohio St.2d 128, 243 N.E.2d 66 (1968); Farley v. Graney, 14-6
W.Va. 22, 119 S.E.2d 833 (1960).
61 Preferred Tires, Inc. v. Village of Hempstead, 173 Misc. 1017, 19 N.Y.S.2d 374-
(Sup. Ct. 1940). Laggis, supra note 46, points out that the judicial task of extracting
modern, useful opinions from maxims born of a drastically different socio-economic
era has at times been most tenuous.
62 274 N.Y. 82, 87, 8 N.E.2d 286, 288 (1937).
63 Comment, supra note 12.
64 For cases to this effect, see note 10 supra.
65 "Association with beauty can enlarge man's imagination and revive his spirit. Ugli-
ness can demean the people who live among it. What a citizen sees every day is
his America. If it is attractive it adds to the quality of his life. If it is ugly it can
(Continued on next page)
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[i]t is within the power of the legislature to determine
that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy,
spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully
patrolled.... If those who govern the District of Columbia
decide that the Nation's Capitol shall be beautiful as well as
sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands
in the way.
It has been argued that relief of the eye from irritating color
and motif should be as justified before the law as removing dis-
agreeable noises from the ear. 7 Why should not "landscape pollu-
tion"68 be of equal concern to the public as noise pollution? Govern-
ments may condemn land for public highways and parks explicitly
for scenic reasons.69 Why is not regulation of land permitted for the
same reasons?
In short, despite any definitional problems associated with the
open recognition of aesthetics as a part of the police power, it would
seem to be the only way of logically and consistently upholding bill-
board controls while providing a justifiable purpose to which the
adopted measures may bear a reasonable relationship.
An Approach
Once the purpose of billboard legislation has been unequivocally
established and judicially approved, it becomes possible to select: the
optimum means of executing that purpose. Any regulation must be
reasonably related to values recognized as legitimate elements of
public interest,70 and, particularly regulations enforcible by the pblice
power, must be precise and specific as to the evils they are intended
to prevent.7 1 Such regulations, as in Ohio, must bear a real and sub-
stantial relationship to the police power.?2
First, the regulatory purpose should be defined within the statute.
The avowed object, for example, of the "Highway Beautification Act
(Continued from preceding page)
degrade his existence . . . .Beauty has other immediate values. It adds to safety
whether removing direct dangers to health or making highways less monotonous
or dangerous . . . But a beautiful America will require the effort of government
at every level, of business, and of private groups." 111 CoNc. REcoRo 2045 (1965)
(Special message to Congress).
19 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
67 Hav-A-Tampa Cigar Co. v. Johnson, 149 Fla. 408, 5 So.Zd 433 (1942).
68 Williams, supra note 50 at 701.
69 It has been held that the public use of roads is not limited to use as a mere busi-
ness necessity or ordinary convenience, but also includes its use as a scenic highway
for the public enjoyment, recreation, and health. Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S.
700 (1923). The condemnation of land for public parks has long been recognized as
a taking for public use for an admittedly recreational purpose. Shoemaker v. Ulnited
States, 147 U.S. 282 (1893).
70 Laggis, supra note 4 at 171.
71 DiCello, supra note 52 at 387.
72 Leet v. City of Eastlake, 7 Ohio App.2d 218, 220 N.E.2d 121 (Ct. App. 1966).
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of 1965 ''73 is to protect the public investment in such highways, pro-
mote safety anid recreational value of public travel, and preserve
natural beauty. Ohio has not enacted a preamble or purpose clause,
but in light of the demonstrated difficulties in judicial construction
of legislative intent,74 it would seem highly desirable to so do.
Second, the intent of legislation should be regulation, not prohibi-
tion. Where property rights are concerned, an unyielding prohibition
is far less likely to withstand constitutonal attack than a reasonable
regulation. 75 In the "Highway Beautification Act," the Congressional
intent was to provide a loose framework whereby each state may en-
act suitable regulations. 76 To preserve a governmental balance of
power, land-use control was to be placed in the hands of the states,
77
although most states have blindly followed the federal standards.
Further regulations were to be established through agreement be-
tween the Secretary of Commerce and the individual states.78 Such
standards should be carefully adapted to that state's needs and con-
stitutional barriers since they must weather legal attacks within
that state.
To illustrate the inequity of maintaining a strict prohibition,
consider an off-highway service station desiring to obtain an off-
premises sign location in order to be visible from the roadway. Ac-
cording to section 5516.02 of the Ohio Revised Code:
No advertising device shall be erected or maintained
within six hundred sixty feet of the edge of the right of way
of a highway on the interstate system except the following:
(C) Advertising devices indicating the name of the busi-
ness or profession conducted on such property or which iden-
tify the goods produced, sold, or services rendered on such
property; ....
This station owner must either erect a sign high enough to be
seen (which in itself may be aesthetically displeasing), or else pur-
chase or lease a parcel of land from the business premises to the
73 23 U.S.C. § 131 (1965).
73a Id. § 131 (a).
74 For example, the court in O'Mealia Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Borough of Ruther-
ford, 128 N.J.L. 587, 27 A.2d 863 (Sup. Ct. 1942) ; after failing to establish a rela-
tionship between a billboard ordinance and the public health, safety and general
welfare, stated that it was possible the ordinance had been enacted for aesthetic
reasons. No specific purpose was indicated in the ordinance, causing the court to
grope for a proper legislative intent. See also Comment, supra note 48 at 102, for the
importance of a preamble to define legislative intent.
75 Restrictions on the power to prohibit are even more stringent than those on the
power to regulate. Ellis v. Ohio Turnpike Comm., 162 Ohio St. 86, 120 N.E.2d 719
(1954).
76 It has been intimated, however, that such flexibility may be lacking and considerable
disagreement has ensued between individual states and the Federal Highway Admin-
istration as to the proper interpretation of the national standards. Hearings on
Highway Beautification .4d, supra note 33.
77 Hearings, supra note 47 at 2745.
78 23 USC § 131 (d) (1965).
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advertising site-an often exorbitant proceduce. Were it not for the
strict regulation that signs be located on the premises, the business
could undertake the far less costly measure of leasing a sign site
along with an easement for entry purposes. It would not then be
necessary to technically qualify for on-premises treatment. Zoning
boards might prevent such needless economic waste in situations
where no overriding support exists for the application of the general
rule to a particular business.
. The rigid distinction between accessory (on-premises) and non-
accessory (off-premises) displays, presents other thorny problems.
For example, once aesthetics is deemed the purpose behind controls,
should it matter whether the sign is on or off business premises?7 9
Signs advertising business conducted on the premises may be just as
unsightly and objectionable as off-premises billboards. Several
cases have held that this distinction is arbitrary and unreasonable; 80
others have rejected this argument with sometimes less than crystal
clear reasoning.8 '
It has been the tendency of most courts to permit the accessory/
non-accessory classification, probably on the basis of the owner's sup-
posedly superior property rights. 82 Against a heritage of property
rights being held sacrosanct, many courts have gone overboard in
seeking to protect them.8 3 But the use of property is subject to con-
trol,84 especially in commercial and industrial zoned areas. There is
also no guaranteed right to commercially advertise, 85 nor is it an
absolute incident of property rights since ownership of land does
not include an unrestricted right to use such land for any purpose.88
The privilege of advertising along public highways should be granted
79 No, according to Sunrad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 122 So.2d 611 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1960).
80 Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority v. Crystal 2 App. Div.2d 37, 153 N.Y.S.2d
387 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1956); Mid-State Advertising Corp. v. Bond, 274 N.Y. 82,
8 N.E.2d 286 (1937); Central Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Village of Evendale, 54
Ohio Op. 354, 124 N.E.2d 189 (C.P. 1954).
8s General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Dept. of Public Works, 289 Mass. 149, 193 N.E.
799 (1935) (advertising for local cattle show not the same as permanent billboards) ;
United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Raritan, 11 N.J. 144, 93 A.2d 362 (Sup. Ct.
1952); Criterion Service, Inc. v. East Cleveland, 152 Ohio St. 416, 89 N.E.2d 475
(1949); J&N Corp. v. Green Bay, 28 Wis.2d 583, 137 N.W. 434 (1965).
82 It was also suggested in Railway Express v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); that
there is a real difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire. It is
one thing to tolerate action from those who act on their own, and it is another
thing to permit that action to be promoted for a price.
83 An ordinance making the location of retail stores in exclusively residential areas
unlawful without a majority consent of home owners was held invalid as a depri-
vation of valuable property rights. People v. Chicago, 261 11. 16, 103 N.E. 609 (1913).
84 Broad powers as to highway planning, design and construction may be carried out
as long as it bears a real and substantial relation to public safety. Ghaster Properties,
Inc. v. Preston, 20 Ohio App.2d 51, 184 N.E.2d 552, (C.P. 1962).
85 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
Se The Ohio General Assembly may prohibit a particular use if it comes within the
police power. Ghaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston, 176 Ohio St. 425, 200 N.E.2d 328
(1964).
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by legislatures based. upon, a sensible application of reasonable: and
consistent objectives.
It might be argued that a common sense distinction be drawn
between types of advertisers on the basis of necessity. A motel located
a few miles off a highway -has a more equitable claim to a privilege
to accost the traveler's attention than does a national brand name
advertiser.8 7 Similarly, public convenience should be weighed in
cases where advertisements guiding the weary traveler to-food, lodg-
ing, or fuel might be quite appropriate and beneficial. Considerations
such as relative needs to advertise, and the public desire to be,
reached by advertising, could be balanced against concern for public
safety and environmental beauty by zoning authorities charged with
granting or denying permits for the location of all signs.8 8
Legislation must provide ample freedom for the balancing of
public interests with the rights of advertisers. North Dakota declared.
it to be in the public interest to reasonably regulate advertising -along-
specified highways, while recognizing that both the convenience of
travel and the interests of the economy as a whole require a reason-
able freedom to advertise.8 9 Such flexibility in weighing competing
interests is best achieved through the use of state and local zoning
boards, empowered to execute broad purposes in directing and plan-
ning the growth and appearance of urban and rural areas. The pu-
posesof zoning go far beyond protection of public health,' safety, .and
morality,90 and the relevant 'considerations could be numerous.9 '
Another obvious advantage to this form of control is the absence .f
cost to taxpayers, 92 as opposed to the compensation requirement
exacted under the application of eminent domain.93
87 Comment, Outdoor Advertising Control Along the Interstate High-way System,, 46
CAL.'L. REV. 796, 811 (1958).
88 Considerable leeway in this regard was given to local authorities by the Supreme
Court in Railway Express v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949), which held. that' ual
protection may be based upon practical considerations from experience. It migit'also
be noted that 23 U.S.C. § 131 no longer contains any distinctions based on types
of signs. Since Ohio originally adopted exceptions based on sign types for the ap-
parent purpose of complying with the federal standards, there now appears' to be
no sound-basis for retaining these exemptions.
89 N. D. CENT. COnE ANN. § 24-17-01 (1967).
90 Murphy, Inc. v. Town of Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 40 A.2d 177 (1944).
91 A 'zoning authority, in graniing or rejecting permits governing sign location," culd
consider the nature of the area or community, population patterns, preservation of
scenic beauty, maximum safety, and other similar factors bearing a reasonable rela-
tionship to the police power. Powers, Control of Outdoor Advertising-State lmle-
mentation of Federal Law and Standards, 38 NED. L. REv. 541 (1959). -North Dakota
has established state zoning boards having broad powers to protect and guide the
development of non-urban areas, to designate land necessary for restoration, and to
determine zoned or unzoned industrial areas. Such board may also acquire. land
under the power' of eminent domain. N. D. CENrT. CODE ANN. § 24-17-01 (1967)..
92 Williams, supra note 50 at 703.
93 Comment, Aesthetic Considerations in Land Use Planning, 35 ALBANY L. REV..,126,
140 (1970), suggests that the modern trend is to give considerable leeway to the
use of the police power to bring it closer to the concept of eminent domain. The
use of eminent domain involves problems of whether advertising rights, are; an
interest entitled to compensation. On the further question of evaluation, see Sowers
v. Schaeffer, 155 Ohio St. 454, 99 N.E.2d 313 (1951).
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Several changes in the existing Ohio billboard law have recently
been effected by the Ohio legislature.9 4 This bill extends the basic
provisions of section 5516.02 of the Ohio Revised Code (formerly ap-
plicable only to interstate highways) to primary highways and to
commercial and industrial zones traversed by segments of the inter-
state system within the boundaries of incorporated municipalities. 95
Such regulations are to be effected through the issuance of permits
by the Director of Highways. No standards for granting or denying
permits, however, are mentioned; the only additional guideline is that
the Director shall promulgate and enforce regulations consistent with
customary use in outdoor advertising and national policy. 96 Neither of
these two criteria appears sufficiently well-defined to afford an ade-
quate framework in which the state of Ohio may intelligently regu-
late outdoor advertising. Why did not the General Assembly clearly
acknowledge recognition of a public concern for the preservation of
the natural state of the environment and develop more concise guide-
lines commensurate with that purpose?
One redeeming portion of the Ohio revision purports to sanction
zoning authorities as an alternate method of carrying out the legis-
lative intent, 97 although that precise intent is nowhere defined. This
alternative may allow the type of flexible planning and regulation
needed to accomplish the implied intent. Congress set the tone by
providing that the states shall have full authority under their own
zoning laws to zone areas for comercial or industrial purposes, and
the actions of the states in this regard would be accepted for the pur-
poses of the Act.98 Thus, even if the Ohio act does not formulate
plans for the creation of zoning boards having broad concern for the
appearance of public highways, all may not be lost if existing boards
are given sufficient leeway to plan and to regulate in lieu of execut-
ing the prohibitions contained therein.
Conclusion
As a practical matter, courts have shown a seemingly irreversible
propensity to uphold billboard legislation, at least as applied to
off-premises advertising. This may be fashionable and accepted, but it
has been accomplished at the expense of creating unnecessarily vague,
94 S.B. 361, 109th Gen. Ass'y, Reg. Sess. (1971-72), has amended §§ 5516.01-.02, 5516.99
of the OHIO REv. CODE, and enacted §§ 5516.06-.13 and 5531.07. The apparent thrust
of the bill is to update and expand existing law in an overall effort to comply with
the more liberal tenor of 23 U.S.C. § 131.
95 OHIO REV. CoDE § 5516.06 (as enacted Dec. 7, 1971). Primary highways are defined
as an adequate system of connected main highways, selected or designated by each
state through its state highway department, subject to approval by the Secretary of
Commerce. Such system shall not exceed seven per cent of the total highway mileage
of such state. 23 U.S.C. § 103 (1967).
s OHIO REV. CODE § 5516.09 (as enacted Dec. 7, 1971).
s OHIO REv. CODE § 5516.11 (as enacted Dec. 7, 1971).
98 23 U.S.C. § 131 (d) (1965).
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inconsistent, and strained decisions. The history of billboard legis-
lation is a prototype of the history of all land-use regulations cal-
culated to improve or preserve the appearance of the community. 99
The seeds of environmental concern have been well planted and in
the years ahead, improvement of the land's appearance may be one
of the more significant social challenges. Growth of highways and
environmental consciousness has accelerated the need for increased
planning, which must occur within clearly established constitutional
guidelines. 00
Therefore, not only is there adequate reason for encouraging
aesthetic planning and control, but also the constitutional recogni-
tion of aesthetics in specific connection with the regulation of outdoor
advertising along public roadways will serve to help clarify a hazy
area of the law. If the preservation and enhancement of the natural
beauty of our highways is in itself deemed a legitimate end, then
legislatures and courts may more logically and honestly determine
appropriate methods of serving that end. As long as courts fail to
recognize aesthetics alone to be a basis for supporting billboard regu-
lations, state legislatures, in shielding their true purpose, will con-
tinue to draft vague and confusing bits of law, thereby perpetuating
a needless fiction.
99 R. ANDERSON, supra note 20 at 509.
100 "Today, the great density of our urban population, the numerous forms of industry
and the general complexity of our civilization render it necessary for the state to take
steps to preserve what remains of our nation's beauty, if it is not to perish in our
times." Moore, jupra note 41 at 203.
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